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iNtRODuCtiON
Adequate fiscal institutions, such as fiscal rules, fiscal 
councils and procedural rules can significantly contribute to 
the success of national fiscal policies. Fiscal rules encompass 
the quantitative requirements for debt, deficit or 
expenditures that apply to certain parts or the entire 
general government. Defining a fiscal council is a more 
difficult task, as this may fulfil several functions.2 Procedural 
budgetary rules govern the preparation, approval and 
execution of the budget act. This article primarily deals 
with the former two topics.
These topics are all the more relevant now as the budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States have come under particular 
scrutiny in the European Union’s package of economic 
governance legislative proposals. The package of reforms 
stresses, in particular, the importance of surveillance, and 
thus the role of independent analysis carried out by bodies 
endowed with functional autonomy and the role of cash-flow 
data. It recommends the preparation of projections for each 
major expenditure and revenue item for the budget year and 
beyond based on unchanged policies. The operation of 
general government bodies and funds which do not form part 
of the regular budgets should be given particular 
consideration, because public finances should be 
comprehensively covered by the budgetary frameworks. At 
the same time, it calls for a solution that would prevent a 
procyclical fiscal policy. This means that ideal fiscal rule 
would be able to distinguish between the deficit-increasing 
impacts of exogenous factors (economic downturn) and those 
of fiscal loosening. No corrective measures would be 
required in the former case, while consoslidation efforts 
would be needed in the latter case. It recommends that 
consequences in the event of non-compliance should be 
applied, which, in practice, could mean the automatic 
application of deficit-reducing measures.
The first section of this article presents the characteristics 
of the Visegrád countries and their fiscal rules. We then 
continue with the issue of the debt limit. Subsequently, we 
examine the annual balance targets, followed by the 
requirements setting the growth rate of expenditures, 
which could be an instrument for achieving the balance 
targets. Finally, we review the possible functions of a fiscal 
council. In closing, we draw our conclusions.
ludovit Odor and Gábor P. Kiss1: the exception 
proves the rule? Fiscal rules in the Visegrád 
countries*
This article gives an overview of the national fiscal rules in force or recommended for introduction in the Visegrád 
countries. In the article, we review the various potential elements of the regulation framework, in particular the debt rule 
as a limit, the balance target, the expenditure rule as an instrument and the fiscal council as a supporting entity for the 
entire framework. We establish on the one hand that the more a rule covers the scope of fiscal policy, the more effective 
it becomes. On the other hand, it is highlighted that filtering out the effect of exogenous factors − such as the economic 
cycle − is also important in ensuring that the rules restrict fiscal policy in such a way as to simultaneously prevent 
procyclical measures. The difficulty resides in the fact that the effects of exogenous factors and fiscal policy are difficult 
to distinguish. Resolving this issue may be one of the tasks of the fiscal council.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1   Ludovit Odor is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and Gábor P. Kiss is the MNB’s principal economist. The analysis reflects the personal 
opinion of the authors. We would like to express our gratitude to the participants of the debate held at the MNB for their comments; the authors bear 
responsibility for any errors made in this article.
2   A literary review of the role of independent fiscal agencies can be found in the Debrun et al. (2009). For a discussion of the possible roles of fiscal 
councils, see Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011).MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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CHARACteRiStiCS OF tHe ViSeGRÁD 
COuNtRieS 
The Videgrád countries − the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia − have several interrelated common 
features (for more information, see Odor, 2011).
•   Higher  macroeconomic  volatility  compared  to  more 
developed countries, i.e. higher GDP fluctuation.
•   this is partly the result of “stop-go” cycles of fiscal policy, 
which lead to stronger fluctuations in the deficit in 
comparison to developed countries.
•   Substantial  current  account  deficits  and  greater 
dependence on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).
•   lower tax potential, caused, in addition to the openness 
of the economy, by higher tax evasion.
•   Public expenditure pressures are also higher, stemming 
from lower fixed capital levels, labour market problems 
and the constant lack of resources for certain state 
functions.
•   Widespread corruption and less effective enforcement of 
compliance with laws.
One apparently common feature is the low level of public 
debt and higher growth potential. From the perspective of 
our subject, it is worth examining whether the above apply 
to all four countries.
•   Debt as a percentage of GDP is close to the eu average 
only in the case of Hungary and is significantly lower in 
the other three countries.
•   the situation is somewhat different, however, if we take 
into account differences in development levels. These 
differences must be taken into consideration as the level 
of debt that foreign investors are willing to finance is 
higher in more developed countries.3 If we adjust the 
level of debt in the Visegrád countries by the size of gap 
in GDP compared to the EU average measured at 
purchasing power parity (Chart 2), the debt of Hungary 
and Poland soars above the average (Chart 1).4 Hungary’s 
debt − adjusted by its level of development − has been 
elevated in a regional comparison ever since the regime 
change. By contrast, Slovakia’s initial level of debt was 
significantly lower. During the economic transformation, 
hidden debts (such as public companies and financial 
institutions) appeared on the one part, but were offset by 
revenues from the privatisation of state assets. The debt 
dynamics of the past decade, however, have primarily 
been determined by the “stop-go” cycles of fiscal policy.
•   Compared  to  the  eu  average,  GDP  trends  measured  at 
purchasing power parity were also quite divergent among 
the Visegrád countries (Chart 2). In the second half of the 
1990s, the privatisation of state assets and the inflow of FDI 
were determining factors, while in the 2000s Hungary was 
also characterised by “stop-go” cycles. Moreover, the role of 
labour market and financing conditions (the credit boom and 
its reversal) also became key factors. Since the crisis, the 
growth potential of certain countries compared to their 
more developed peers has become less obvious. Although an 
overall trend of convergence characterises relatively 
homogenous economic areas5 (faster growth in less 
developed countries), this trend is not automatic (see the 
case of Greece) and depends on economic policy. Economic 
convergence may represent a key factor in curbing the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio (for example Slovakia in the 2000s).
Chart 1
Relative indebtedness adjusted by relative 
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Source: calculations on the basis of Eurostat data.
3   Efficiently used resources (such as infrastructure investments) can in principle affect the level of development, so this represents a possible correlation 
between debt and development.
4   To calculate relative indebtedness, we divided the debt compared to the EU average by GDP compared to the EU average, measured at purchasing 
power parity.
5 For a summary, see Acemoglu (2008) for instance.MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 27
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It is an interesting contradiction that while the Visegrád 
region is broadly characterised by relatively high levels of 
deficit, at the same time voters and companies alike 
consider public debt to be a serious issue.6 This may be due 
to the low fiscal transparency that allows deficits to 
increase prior to elections. Fiscal loosening is not reflected 
in the increase of budget appropriations in certain cases, 
rendered possible by the optimistic planning of revenues, 
while in other cases, expenditures can be temporarily 
concealed by creative accounting. An example of the latter 
is temporarily cutting back subsidies to public companies, 
and after elections assuming the debt which simultaneously 
increases the deficit. Poor transparency thus often leads to 
wrong motives (Horvath and Odor, 2009). The other factor 
behind concerns about public debt and tolerance for high 
deficits maybe the heterogeneity of voters. Although voters 
may be aware of the fact that an unsustainably high deficit 
may require adjustment, they may be hoping that other 
social groups will bear the burden thereof.7 
just  like  voters,  debt-funding  financial  markets  are  also 
ineffective in disciplining fiscal policy in time. As a result, 
this may take place too late and so radically that it may give 
rise to a liquidity crisis, jeopardising the renewal of 
maturing debt.  8
In principle, fiscal policy may also be regulated by 
international organisations. The EU’s supervisory role is 
somewhat stronger within the euro area than in member 
states not included in the monetary union. However, as 
the EU’s set of regulations focuses primarily on current 
years, it fails to adequately regulate forms of creative 
accounting that push the costs generated by government 
decisions (public private partnership investments) forward 
in time, or retroactively deteriorate the previous period’s 
budget. International organisations (such as the 
International Monetary Fund or the new European Stability 
Mechanism [ESM] within the euro area) could in principle 
exercise much greater control if they would grant credit 
subject to certain criteria. If necessary, they could even 
define fiscal criteria in a way that would effectively 
counteract creative accounting. The problem, however, is 
that these could only be enforced at a late stage, when 
borrowing has already become critical, due to lack of 
confidence on the market.
FiSCAl RuleS AND FiSCAl COuNCilS 
iN tHe ViSeGRÁD ReGiON
Due to deficits that are characterised by peaks from time 
to time, fiscal rules have been or are currently being 
introduced in several countries in the region, representing 
a form of fiscal self-restraint. On a similar note, fiscal 
councils have also been set up or will be set up in the 
future, which may bolster the efficiency and credibility of 
self-restraint. In the following section, we take a look at the 
Visegrád countries one by one.
In Poland, the fiscal regulation governing debt − incorporated 
in the constitution − has been in place since 1997, restricting 
the debt calculated on the basis of the national methodology 
at 60% of GDP.9 The act on public finances complemented 
this with several provisions. For one, it introduced protective 
Chart 2
Relative development compared to the eu average 
expressed in GDP calculated at purchasing power 
parity












































































6   According to KPMG’s (2010) survey, 75% of Czech and Slovakian senior corporate decision-makers were deeply or exceptionally concerned by the level 
of public debt, the highest rate among the 26 countries examined. Poland ranks eleventh on this list, while Hungary ranks eighteenth. In the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, 90% of citizens considered public debt to be the greatest threat (Nézõpont Intézet, 2011; Ipsos Tambor, 2010). In Poland, less 
than 50% of voters would support an increase of the constitutional debt limit (GfK Polonia, commissioned by Rzeczpospolitej, 2010).
7   Although a different indicator, agreeing with the statement “People can only get rich at the expense of others” suggests a similar mentality. Compared 
to the average of a sample of 50 countries, people in Poland ranked average whereas Hungarians scored far above average (World Values Survey 
Association, 2009).
8   Hauner and Kumar (2006), and Balassone et al. (2006) demonstrated that interest rates and credit ratings generally represented low costs for 
governments.
9   The National Road Fund, for instance, forming part of the general government according to the National Accounts, falls outside of its scope. This 
presented a loophole in the rule.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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bands of 50% and 55%. There is no escape clause in the 
event that the ceiling is breached.
If debt exceeds the 50% ceiling (which occurred in 2003 and 
2010), a budgetary act ensuring that the revenue level of 
the subsequent second year’s budget will not decrease 
must be adopted in the following year.
Breaching the 55% debt ceiling triggers significantly more 
severe measures:
•   A  budgetary  act  ensuring  that  the  subsequent  second 
year’s budget will be a zero-deficit budget must be 
adopted in the following year.
•   expenditures of budgetary units may only exceed revenues 
if they are EU-funded expenditures.
•   Public  wages  are  frozen,  pensions  are  only  indexed  to 
inflation (instead of 20% of real wage indexation), and 
budgetary lending is entirely prohibited.
•   the  government  reviews  expenditure  programmes 
implemented through foreign credit, and prepares long-
term programmes and consolidation programmes.
Breach of the 60% constitutional limit imposes a restriction 
on budgetary units, the expenditures of which may not 
exceed their revenues, and public sector guarantees are 
prohibited. In this case, the government must prepare a 
consolidation programme with measures aimed at bringing 
the debt below the 60% ceiling.
Separate rules set out in the act on public finances apply to 
local governments. First, their debt may not exceed 60% of 
their revenues, and second, their debt service expenditures 
(interest plus instalments) may not exceed 15% of their 
revenues. As there is no protective band for these limits, 
the restrictions only take effect if the values are breached, 
allowing ample leeway until then, just like in 2009 and 
2010.
The public finances act also introduced a rule governing 
expenditure in 2011, which will remain in force as long as 
Poland is included in the EU’s excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP). This rule only allows discretionary budgetary 
expenditures (approx. 5% of GDP) to amount to 1% of real 
annual growth. Interest expenditure, EU payments, road 
construction and maintenance, long-term projects, 
EU-funded projects and defence expenditures are all 
classified as non-discretionary items.
Hungary incorporated a rule into its act on local governments 
in 1996, setting adjusted own revenues as the ceiling for its 
annual commitments generating local government debt 
(loans and contributions, bond issues, guaranties and 
leases). Adjusted own revenues are 70% of planned annual 
own revenues minus the amount of short-term liabilities 
(capital and interest repayment, lease fees) due that year. 
Similarly to the Polish rule, there is no protective band, and 
thus it only becomes effective once the limit is breached, 
leaving ample leeway until that point.10 A major advantage 
of the rule is that it restricts not only credit-type 
expenditures, but also the guaranties substituting them 
(such as for the debt of local government companies) and 
lease fees (and thus public private partnerships as well).
Regarding the central budget, the act on fiscal 
responsibility was adopted in 2008 (for an assessment of 
the act, see Baksay and P. Kiss, 2009) restricting the 
expansion of debt by deducing deficit targets in a 
forward-looking manner from real debt. The above were 
complemented with expenditure and procedural rules 
(compulsory compensation, PAYGO). Transparency was 
improved by including public private partnerships and 
public companies into the applied deficit indicator. (The 
latter was removed from the scope of the act in 2010, 
before it entered into force.) A three-member fiscal 
council was set up, the first in the region, assisted by 
forty economists. In 2011, the council was radically 
restructured. The President of the State Audit Office of 
Hungary and the Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
became members, and the head of the council was 
appointed by the President of the Republic. The team of 
experts assigned to the council was dissolved; members 
now rely on their own institutions for support.
The constitution adopted in 2011 defined a 50% limit on the 
central budget's debt. As the debt currently stands much 
higher than this, the constitution declares that until the 
target is reached, the Parliament may only adopt a central 
budget act that prescribes the reduction of public debt 
measured in proportion to total GDP. In order to ensure 
compliance with the above, the preliminary approval of the 
fiscal council is required for the adoption of the central 
budget act, essentially granting it a right of veto. Divergences 
from the debt rule are only permitted in the event of an 
exceptional legal order, only to the extent required to 
mitigate the circumstances having triggered it, or to the 
extent required to restore balance in the event of a 
prolonged and substantial downturn in the national 
economy. The constitution aims to restrict local government 
indebtedness by requiring approval by the government for 
10 Following the debt wave of 2007, debt could increase by another 2-2.5 fold according to estimates (Homolya and Szigel, 2008).MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 29
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those financial obligations of local governments which 
exceed a limit stipulated by law.
In  Slovakia, expenditures within the central budget may 
only increase by 1% (nominally), if revenues exceed the 
appropriation. The main objective of this rule is to enforce 
adjustment during times of economic expansion. A sort of 
golden rule applies to local governments, only allowing 
them to become indebted up to the extent of investments. 
Over and above this amount, local government debt may 
not exceed 60% of the previous year’s current revenues, 
and debt service may not exceed 25% of current revenues. 
There is no fiscal council; there is, however, a committee in 
charge of issuing macroeconomic forecasts and another one 
responsible for issuing tax forecasts, made up of independent 
experts and analysts, in order to define the foundations for 
the budget's tax revenues. It is their task to form and 
officially assess the forecasts made by the Ministry of 
Finance.
Slovakia is currently preparing to adopt an act on fiscal 
responsibility. The concept places emphasis on net worth 
and plans to introduce several types of fiscal rules.11 The 
new fiscal framework would be supervised by an 
independent fiscal council funded by the central bank. Its 
responsibilities would primarily include the evaluation of 
compliance with fiscal rules, the preparation of long-term 
generational accounting and assessing the impacts of draft 
legislation.
Among the planned fiscal rules, the new debt limit, 
expenditure rules and the amendment of the rules governing 
local governments deserve mention. The debt limit would 
apply to the debt defined in the gross statistical sense and 
would be paired with protective bands. The protective 
bands would become activated 10 percentage points below 
the ceiling, and would trigger stricter measures for every 
2-3 percentage points. The expenditure rule would include 
the entire public sector (including public companies), with 
the exception of local governments, and would take into 
account tax expenditures. It would not apply, however, to 
European Union funds, interest expenditures and fluctuations 
stemming from the economic cycle. The value of the 
expenditure ceilings would be derived from the trajectory 
of the sustainability indicator planned by the government 
for the upcoming four years. As a result, the rule would 
treat long-term structural measures (such as pension 
reforms) and immediate balance adjustments identically. 
Local government rules, however, would be amended by 
the addition of protective bands under the debt limits, the 
broadening of the definition of debt (public private 
partnerships), and making bankruptcy proceedings more 
stringent.
The Czech Republic introduced its local government rule in 
1998, according to which debt service expenditures 
(repayment and interest) may not exceed 30% of current 
revenues. However, there is no fiscal rule or fiscal council 
regulating the central budget, with only some general 
concepts regarding their formation.
The above illustrates the diversity of the fiscal frameworks 
among the Visegrád countries. The various elements, 
however, may be correlated, as reflected by the EU’s most 
recent recommendations. In addition to the function of a 
debt limit, the budget balance may fulfil the role of an 
operational target. The expenditure rule can in turn act as 
an instrument for achieving the target, and the fiscal 
council may support the entire regulatory framework. The 
remaining part of this article discusses these four elements 
(debt, the budget balance, the expenditure rule and the 
fiscal council).
DeBt AS A liMit
The debt rule applies to the level of debt. In this sense, it 
can be regarded as a limit, because a fiscal trajectory − as 
an operational target − cannot be deduced from it.12 The 
scope of debt included under the debt rule bears primary 
importance from the perspective of the rule’s efficiency. 
One of the dimensions of this aspect is the coverage of 
entities falling within the scope of the rule.
•   the eu’s debt criteria13 applies to the government sector 
defined in the statistical sense, comprised of the central 
government (budget, social security), local governments 
and part of the public companies included in the 
government sector.
11   The concept of net value, or net worth, examines the state balance sheet. The state has its own specific assets and liabilities, so it is often the case 
that estimates can only be made regarding changes therein, rather than their volume. Examples of such assets are real assets, natural and 
environmental assets or taxation potential. Examples of such liabilities are contingent liabilities or the net present value of future public social 
expenditures. (For details, see for instance Buiter, 1993; Odor, 2011).
12   The Hungarian real debt rule only resembles other debt rules in name, as, contrary to these, it does not define the level of debt, but can instead be 
used for determining deficit targets. As an ex ante rule, it is based on the notion that debt, taken at real value, should not increase, which essentially 
means that a deficit target ensuring an inflation-adjusted (operational) balance of zero must be defined. In other words, the deficit target must 
correspond to the expected level of inflationary compensation included in interest (Baksay and P.Kiss, 2009).
13   The EU’s new economic governance package also formulates a recommendation for the pace of debt reduction. The new rule, however, treats the 
debt criteria as a target approached from above, which is a weakness of the recommendation in our view.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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•   Rules adopted on a national level apply to the subsectors 
defined in a legal sense, rather than a statistical one. 
Local governments are generally governed by a different 
set of rules.14 The central government applies to the 
entities included under the scope of the annual budget 
act. From this perspective, the inclusion of public 
companies can have a significant impact, as the effect of 
quasi-fiscal expenditures not covered by revenue appears 
automatically, irrespective of whether they are 
continuously covered by the budget or whether it assumes 
corporate debt subsequently (e.g. the United Kingdom).
The other dimension of the rule’s scope is how it defines 
debt categories.
•   the  eu’s  criterion  applies  to  gross  debt,  i.e.  liabilities 
based on a creditor/debtor relationship. The current debt 
rules in the Visegrád countries also apply this definition.
•   Certain national rules (e.g. in the united Kingdom) apply 
to the net debt, that is the balance of financial liabilities 
and assets (such as deposits) based on a creditor/debtor 
relationship. This presents the advantage of the effect of 
deposit accumulation or utilisation remaining neutral 
from the perspective of compliance with the rule. 
•   National rules may also diverge from the financial items 
based on a creditor/debtor relationship. One possibility is 
that the national rule covers all financial liabilities and 
assets. The obstacle, however, is that state-owned assets 
are often unmarketable, and thus their valuation is 
unreliable. The other possibility is that it instead includes 
the items over and above financial liabilities, which bear 
greater significance from the perspective of creative 
accounting, such as the liabilities stemming from fixed 
assets generated with the inclusion of private capital 
(public private partnerships). These liabilities, by 
outsourcing public investments, temporarily improve both 
debt levels and the balance, and this effect is only 
reversed after an extended period. The inclusion of 
public private partnerships in debt eliminates the initial 
debt-improving effect.
Debt is a stock indicator reflecting the cumulated impact of 
past deficits. Its advantages and drawbacks both stem from 
its nature of reflecting stocks.
•   its  advantage  is  that  it  contains  the  costs  of  creative 
accounting, albeit with a delay, i.e. it is less prone to 
distortion than the annual budget balance. If, for example, 
losses made by the railway company are not covered for 
several years and are subsequently recognised in one 
lump-sum capital transfer, this expenditure will only 
deteriorate a single year and then phase out. By contrast, 
the expenditure has a permanent effect on the level of 
debt; consequently, in the case of a debt rule, creative 
accounting will have a consequence, even if it is delayed. 
The immediate (real time) effect of creative accounting 
would be captured if the definition of debt would also be 
extended to public companies and public private 
partnership debts. The advantage of real time recognition 
of debt would be that the debt rule could thus restrain 
the fluctuations of the “stop-go” cycle, as it would not 
allow expenditures to be pushed forward in time until 
after elections.
•   its drawback is that it is far more sensitive to fluctuations 
in the economic cycle than the balance. On the one hand, 
the cyclical impact affecting annual fiscal balances 
appears in a cumulated form in the nominal debt. On the 
other hand, the economic cycle also exerts an effect 
through the denominator (GDP), which increases in 
function of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
•   its  drawback  is  that  debt  is  not  only  affected  by  the 
budget balance, but also by the effect of financing 
(privatisation revenues and deposit accumulation or 
utilisation in the case of gross debt), by unexpected 
fluctuations in inflation through the denominator (GDP 
deflator) and by the revaluation of FX debt.15 
The level of public debt is therefore more resistant to 
intentional distortion (creative accounting); nevertheless, it 
can be improved by financing transactions (privatisation). 
The effect of exogenous factors, however, is substantial, as 
both the economic cycle and changes in the exchange rate 
can affect the debt-to-GDP ratio substantially. As the 
discretionary effects of fiscal policy cannot be distinguished 
from those of exogenous factors, the entire fiscal rule 
should not be linked to a single defined debt level. Two 
types of solutions, or their combination, seem viable. 
Firstly, the rule can be rendered more flexible with the help 
of an escape clause (such as the one in the Hungarian 
14   The golden rule applied to local governments is not a debt rule, as it does not limit the volume of debt, only its annual growth, restricting 
indebtedness beyond the accumulation of fixed assets.
15   It is also a sign of the economy's vulnerability if revaluations of FX debt exert a substantial impact on debt. Unexpected spikes in inflation can also 
decrease debt measured as a percentage of GDP, due to higher nominal GDP. However, as yields also adapt to this, nominal debt also gradually 
increases as debt is renewed, and ceteris paribus, the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to its initial value in the medium term. Of course, other expenditures 
and tax revenues would also change due to unexpected inflation, besides interest expenditure, but the effect is smaller in the balance (P. Kiss, 2007a).MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 31
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constitution), and secondly, the Polish and the planned 
Slovakian solution complement the debt limit with 
protection bands, which, if breached, triggers a series of 
increasingly strict measures as the debt increases.
The escape clause can only function effectively if the 
criterion allowing suspension of the rule are clearly 
defined. The usual definition, however, which allows 
exemption from the rule in the case of a certain percentage 
of decrease in GDP, lacks accuracy in and of itself. Any 
decision on the escape clause should therefore be made by 
an independent institution, the fiscal council, where the 
following issues can be adequately analysed.
•   A negative cyclical position does not mean an absolute 
decline (a fall in real GDP), but rather a deviation 
compared to potential (or trend) growth (negative output 
gap). This, however, cannot be measured, but only 
estimated, and such estimates must be updated from 
time to time − the current crisis has revealed how actual 
figures can radically alter the picture formed of the 
trend.
•   Changes in public revenues do not depend on the output 
gap, but on the “gaps” of wages and consumption. 
Changes in GDP may differ from changes in wages and 
consumption, which define revenues. They may diverge 
not only in time and order of magnitude, but also in their 
sign. Therefore, an estimation method that can 
simultaneously perform estimates for several gaps is 
required (Reppa and P. Kiss, 2010).
•   Finally, the exchange rate effect must also be taken into 
account, as depreciation can substantially inflate debt 
depending on the weight of FX debt. This effect is 
obviously mitigated by the fact that depreciation also 
decreases the debt-to-GDP ratio, because GDP as a 
denominator increases. However, this is only gradual, and 
may be of smaller magnitude. For example, if the FX debt 
ratio in Hungary is around 40% and the inflationary effect 
of a unit of change in the HUF/EUR exchange rate exerted 
over a three-year period is only 25%, the depreciation can 
still exert a significant effect on the level of debt over a 
three-year period.
The protective bands paired with debt limits originally 
served the purpose of preventing the debt rule from 
entering into force too late, in other words, it allows the 
restriction of loosening at lower levels. If, however, the 
effect of exogenous factors (output gap, exchange rate) 
cannot be filtered out (see escape clause), bands of ample 
width are required, otherwise (procyclical) tightening may 
be triggered in cases that should not covered by the original 
objective. The Hungarian situation is unique in the Visegrád 
region in that the debt level defined in the rule must first 
be approached from above. There are two options for this. 
On the one hand, the real debt rule can be sustained until 
the 50% level is attained, which defines the trajectory for 
debt reduction.16 On the other hand, some protective bands 
above the 50% level can be implied, which could require 
gradually less serious corrective measures in case of 
convergence toward the 50% level, thereby rewarding 
continuous debt reduction.17
The protective band’s optimal width is determined so that 
is does not leave too much leeway for fiscal loosening on 
the one hand, while being wide enough to accommodate 
the effects of exogenous factors, only breaching the 
protective band in extreme cases.
Poland set protective bands at increments of 5% below the 
constitutional debt limit. This band may be too wide if 
deterioration is caused by deficit-increasing measures, as 
the jump between bands would represent a deficit higher 
than 5% within one year. The band is also too wide from the 
perspective of exogenous factors. A 6% slow-down in GDP 
growth, for instance, could push debt-to-GDP ratio up from 
50% to 53%, and generating an approximately 2 percentage 
point tax loss would increase the debt rate from 53% to 
55%.18 A downturn of this extent, however, did not occur in 
the current crisis. As the ratio of FX debt is around 27%, an 
exchange rate depreciation of 30% would be needed to 
breach the 5% protective band, which is much higher than 
the actual exchange rate fluctuations.
The Slovakian solution includes protective band increments 
of 2-3 percentage points. This is sufficiently narrow to 
mitigate the threat of measures that would substantially 
increase the deficit. The question is whether it is wide 
16   Real debt rule to some extent “looks beyond” the effect of cyclical fluctuations and depreciation. If the decrease is such that economic growth is 
not expected to resume its trend over a two-year forecast horizon, it may lead to slighter procyclical tightening in two years. Only one-third of 
depreciation distorts the rule, as two-thirds of the 1% depreciation affecting the 40% FX ratio are neutralised in the calculation by the fact that 
inflation calculated in three years is 0.25% higher.
17   The section on the expenditure rule presents how this can, for example, be the increasingly less restrained growth rate of budgetary expenditures. 
Between 70% and 65%, for instance, there could be no increase in nominal expenditure, there could be a 2% annual increase between 65% and 60%, 
etc.
18   If the slowdown lasts three years, for instance, a slowdown in GDP of 3.5% would be needed to breach the band, as this would increase the debt/GDP 
ratio from 50% to 51.75%, and annual tax loss would exceed 1%, which would push the debt rate up by 3% over a span of three years.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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enough not to be “activated” by the effect of exogenous 
factors. As Slovakia is a euro area country, no exchange rate 
effect comes into play. At the same time, fluctuations in 
GDP may strengthen. A slowdown of 3.5% is sufficient to 
breach a 2.5% band, which would increase debt-to-GDP ratio 
from 40% to almost 41.5%, supplemented by the effect of a 
higher than 1% cyclical tax loss. In the event of a slowdown 
enduring for a period of three years, a 2% slow-down in 
growth is enough to push the debt rate over the 2.5% band 
by the end of the third year.
In summary, several observations can be made. First, the 
operation of the debt rule is more efficient the closer its 
definition is to the debt category determined by the fiscal 
policy, for example whether it includes public companies 
and public private partnership liabilities, but excludes 
deposits. The escape clause suspending the rule can only 
be efficient if it is capable of identifying the debt-
increasing effect of exogenous factors. As the effect of 
fiscal loosening and exogenous factors is difficult to 
distinguish, the width of protective bands surrounding the 
debt limit must be adequately sized to restrain substantial 
loosening, but to allow sufficient leeway to avoid frequent 
“false alarms” due to the debt-increasing effect of 
exogenous factors.
tHe BuDGet BAlANCe AS A tARGet
In respect of the balance target, the focus is on specific 
years, but there is also a need to include them in a medium-
term time framework. These frameworks enable fulfilment 
of the medium-term balance target and an adequate rate of 
debt reduction. The Hungarian real debt rule, which 
deduces deficit targets from keeping debt unchanged in 
real terms, is an example of the combination of these two 
aspects. A medium-term balance trajectory is necessary 
even in the case of an expenditure rule, as the growth rate 
of expenditures can be defined and fixed for several years 
on the basis thereof.
Similarly to debt, the coverage of the rule is of primary 
importance from the perspective of the balance target’s 
efficiency. One of the dimensions of this aspect is the set 
of entities falling under the scope of the rule.
•   the eu’s balance targets apply to the government sector 
defined in the statistical sense, comprised of the central 
government (budget, social security), local governments 
and some public companies included in the government 
sector. (The latter generally includes only a smaller 
portion of public companies, and loss-making companies 
are only included under special circumstances.)
•   Rules adopted on a national level apply to the subsectors 
defined in a legal sense, rather than a statistical one. The 
so-called golden rule is characteristic of the local 
government sector, stating that the current balance must 
be balanced, and deficit may only be generated up to the 
extent of investment expenditures.19 The central 
government applies to the entities included under the 
scope of the annual budget act. In countries where all 
public companies are included in this group (the United 
Kingdom, for example), the under-financing of quasi-fiscal 
corporate expenditure or extra payments from companies 
do not improve the consolidated balance, even temporarily.
Besides the affected institutional group, another important 
factor is how the rule defines revenues and expenditures.
•   eu  rules  primarily  define  the  balance  based  on  the 
statistics of national accounts. On the one hand, this 
entails the reclassification of a portion of public companies 
into the government sector (which nevertheless does not 
mean that there remains no debt related to quasi-fiscal 
activities, such as PPP investments). On the other hand, 
they remove certain revenues or expenditures from the 
deficit as financing transactions (such as privatisation 
revenues). Finally, most of the revenues and expenditures 
are recorded on an accrual basis, rather than at the time 
of payment. This presents the advantage of allowing less 
option for influencing the balance by timing expenditures.20 
It incurs the cost of a completely different type of data 
collection replacing cash-flow data for certain items, and 
this data collection is only available at a later date. This 
additional time and retroactive statistical adjustments 
make the application of the rule more difficult.
•   National rules generally define the balance based on a 
cash-flow based approach. The advantage here is that this 
19   As EU funds account for an increasingly high share of investment funding, indebtedness should be allowed up to the extent of net investment 
expenditure (P. Kiss, 2007b). When applying netting, the revenues stemming from the sales of real assets (negative investments) should also be 
deducted, in addition to EU funds.
20   The balance can nevertheless still be influenced, even if applying this methodology. On the one hand, a part of transfers remain subject to the cash-
flow approach. On the other hand, the simplest form of accrual accounting (time-adjusted cash) only represents a shift of 1-2 months in cash flow, 
resulting in the equivalent distortion in the accrual approach balance.MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 33
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approach is fully in line with changes in debt, the data are 
almost immediately available and it offers the best 
control during the year. Its drawback is that this control 
can lend itself to abuse, allowing the fine-tuning of the 
balance by shifting payments between years. In the event 
of underfinancing, the fulfilment of public tasks is not 
even reflected as expenditure − only appearing in the 
form of debt assumptions at a later stage − if public 
companies are not included in the coverage of the rule. 
Moreover, not all government-type investments are 
recognised at the time of implementation, as the costs of 
public private partnerships are paid spread out over time.
•   in  Hungary,  the  expert  Body  on  Budgetary  Accounting 
(Költségvetési Elszámolások Szakértői Testülete, KESZT), 
operating in 2010, put forward a recommendation for 
cash-flow based recognition modified in the context of 
national rules (see KESZT, 2010). The objective was to 
preserve the advantages of the cash-flow based approach, 
while making adjustments to eliminate its drawbacks.21 
The adjustments would aim to create comparable data on 
the level of “regular” cash-flow based accounting that 
cannot be distorted by the underfinancing of public tasks, 
the outsourcing of government-type investments in the 
form of public private partnerships, the late settlement 
of invoices, the unrecognised “subsidy content” of 
guaranties and lending programmes initiated by the 
government, and certain capital revenues (such as the 
payments made by persons returning to the state pillar 
from private pension funds).  22
•   in Slovakia an analytical indicator is recommended which 
would complement official accounting instead of replacing 
that, revealing any loopholes in the rules, and enabling 
the preparation of sustainability calculations. Within the 
stock-type indicator approach, this is similar to the 
category of the net worth, albeit taken in the broadest 
possible sense. It is comprised of generational accounting, 
natural resources, the state of the natural environment 
and the net worth of public companies, as well as 
contingent liabilities (guaranties) and public private 
partnership debt. Theoretically, more information can be 
derived about fiscal policy from changes in net worth as 
opposed to focusing solely on the balance. This latter 
flow-type indicator partially overlaps with the KESZT 
recommendation outlined in the previous point.
The balance is a flow-type indicator, and consequently, 
presents different advantages and drawbacks compared to 
the debt indicator.
•   its  advantage  is  that  the  balance  is  immune  to  the 
revaluation of FX debt and privatisation revenue.
•   its  drawback  is  that  without  separate  methodological 
adjustments (see KESZT recommendation), the balance 
for a specific year can be temporarily influenced by 
creative accounting. This could exacerbate “stop-go” 
cycles, taking the form, for instance, of “savings” 
generated by leaving the losses incurred by the railway 
company unrecognised prior to elections and channelling 
them into social transfers, subsequently recognising the 
accumulated corporate losses in a lump-sum payment 
following the elections.
•   its advantage compared to debt is that it is less sensitive 
to the fluctuations of the economic cycle.
•   its weakness compared to the expenditure rule is that the 
cycle’s effect cannot be ignored (a 1% output gap − 
assuming similar wage and consumption gaps − alters the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio by approximately 0.3%). This is 
significant in that fiscal policy and the impact of 
exogenous factors are once again difficult to distinguish; 
for instance, it is difficult to subsequently assess the 
reason(s) behind missing a target. One possible solution 
could be the allocation of provisions for unforeseeable 
negative surprises for the upcoming one year, or 
incorporating an escape clause that would be triggered in 
the event of an unexpected deviation, exceeding a 
certain value.
In summary, the efficiency of such a balance depends on 
the proximity of its definition to the expenditures and 
revenues influenced by fiscal policy. In practice, this means 
it should include, for example, public companies and public 
private partnerships. As the effect of exogenous factors is 
difficult to filter out, provisions should be allocated to 
unforeseeable surprises or an escape clause should be 
incorporated for extreme cases. To ensure transparency, 
the target could be also evaluated on the basis of a 
sustainability analysis (net worth).
21   The recommendation resembles the modified cash-flow indicators used by the Congressional Budget Office in the United States, and the central bank 
in New Zealand and Hungary. The statutory recognition used in the United Kingdom resembles it from the perspective that instead of the general 
government, and recommends the public sector category, comprising public companies.
22   The recognition of PPP projects as budgetary items is prescribed by the official method of accounting effective as of 2010. The act originally included 
the recognition of the accounting profit or loss of companies in majority state ownership as budgetary items in the year the balance sheet is compiled. 
This corporate category, including current profit or loss and depreciation, however, was inconsistent with the budgetary indicator reflecting current 
balance and investment expenditures, so the amendment was revoked before its entry into force. As a solution, the KESZT proposed the consolidation 
of the same budgetary and corporate category, the cash-flow based financing requirement.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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tHe exPeNDituRe Rule AS AN 
iNStRuMeNt
The expenditure rule restricts the growth rate of budgetary 
expenditures and can thus contribute to achieving the 
balance target, consistently with medium-term frameworks. 
Similarly to debt and balance, the scope of entities covered 
by the rule is an essential issue, as is the group of 
expenditures that it applies to; moreover, a distinction 
between certain subgroups of expenditure may also be 
useful.
•   As a part of its new fiscal framework, in the future the eu 
will monitor the growth rate of government spending. In 
the context of assessing convergence towards the medium-
term objective (MTO), both the structural deficit and the 
expenditure trajectory adjusted by the effect of revenue 
measures are examined. As long as a country falls short of 
the medium-term objective, the growth rate of adjusted 
expenditures cannot exceed the economy’s potential 
growth rate.23 The potential growth rate, thus representing 
the ceiling for expenditure growth, is defined based on a 
common methodology. As investment spending may 
fluctuate due to a major project in smaller member 
states, this will also be taken into account.
•   National rules generally cover the consolidated cash-flow 
based expenditures of the budget, according to the legal 
definition. If the legal definition includes them, public 
companies and public private partnerships can be 
classified in this group. Consolidation is required because 
intrabudgetary transfers fall outside of the rule's scope, 
which only covers the final expenditure actually made. 
According to the current Slovakian and earlier KESZT 
recommendations, tax expenditures should also be 
recognised as spending. The gross treatment of this item 
is justified by the fact that from several aspects, they 
could be interchangeable with expenditures, creating a 
loophole in the rule. From the perspective of efficiency, 
it is essential to have the broadest possible range of 
expenditures included under the scope of the rule. 
Expenditures that are defined by acts (exogenous or 
mandatory items according to the Hungarian definition) 
other than the budget act (discretionary items according 
to the Hungarian definition) (see Polish solution) should 
therefore not be excluded.
•   Within the budget expenditure rule, budgetary transfers 
to local governments should be examined separately (P. 
Kiss, 2007b). Such transfers should be defined along with 
tax sharing with the budget, allowing all resources 
assigned to local governments to be recognised jointly. 
Separate treatment of local governments is justified, as it 
prevents a disproportionately high or low portion of the 
total growth in budgetary spending from appearing as 
local government revenues. If tasks and resources are 
adequately distributed among the central government 
and local governments, there is no reason, for example, 
for a disproportionately high portion of fiscal adjustment 
to be assigned to local governments. 
•   in addition to spending, there are forms of state guaranties 
that partly represent a subsidy. If this can be determined 
(KESZT recommendation), it can be included in the spending 
and the balance. If, however, the amount of support cannot 
be determined, expenditure ceilings may have to be 
extended to guaranties as well (P. Kiss, 2007b). In this case, 
the expenditure ceiling cannot be circumvented through the 
expansion of support in the form of guarantee. The creation 
of groups for guarantees, however, is important, according 
to their probability of being called (low, medium or high), 
with a different ceiling assigned to each group.
The expenditure rule has different advantages and 
drawbacks in comparison to the balance and debt rule.
•   its advantage is that, similarly to the balance, it is not 
affected by the revaluation of FX debt and privatisation 
revenues.
•   it presents the advantage of having small cyclical effects 
on expenditure. Although spending co-varies with the 
cycle due to its indexing to real indicators (such as the 
Swiss indexing of pensions), this is mostly offset by the 
opposite movements in spending stemming from 
unemployment. Accordingly, fiscal policy is clearly 
responsible for the trends in spending, as opposed to 
exogenous factors. This is also the reason why the EU’s 
fiscal framework will monitor spending separately.
•   its  drawback  is  that  without  separate  methodological 
adjustments (see KESZT recommendation), the spending 
for a specific year can be temporarily influenced by 
creative accounting. This could exacerbate “stop-go” 
cycles, for instance, by increasing social transfers at the 
costs of underfinancing the railway company, subsequently 
recognising the accumulated corporate losses in a lump-
sum capital transfer following elections.
23   Expenditures must be adjusted by revenue measures in order to allow both the implementation of higher expenditure growth offset by tax increases 
and tax cuts offset by spending cuts.MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 35
THE EXCEPTION PROVES THE RULE? FISCAL RULES IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES
•   Another drawback is that the expenditure rule does not 
fully ensure achievement of the balance target. This is 
required to ensure the reliability of estimates of the 
envisaged tax measures and macroeconomic forecasts on 
the revenue side.
Another important question regarding the expenditure rule 
is how and for what time horizon the growth rate should be 
determined. The growth rate generally applies to the 
nominal, rather than the real index (on its advantages, see: 
P. Kiss, 2007b). If the time horizon over which the growth 
rate of spending is determined reaches the average length 
of the economic cycle, budgetary expenditures can fulfil 
the role of automatic stabilisers, as their growth remains 
constant throughout the cycle. The minimal requirement 
could be that the time span be equal to those of medium-
term planning frameworks, thereby contributing to 
achievement of the balance trajectory defined therein. The 
selection of the level of expenditures and revenue, however, 
is a matter of social preferences; nominally fixed spending, 
for instance, can contribute to the gradual attainment of a 
low expenditure level. This may change or even reverse 
depending on the political cycle.
One general problem is that although adjustment can be 
obtained by applying debt, balance and expenditure rules, 
ensuring its sustainability by structural measures is less 
viable. The relative advantage of the expenditure rule is 
that it may in principle promote structural measures on the 
expenditure side. However, as structural measures may also 
incur costs, which are disregarded by the rules, they may 
represent a form of counter-incentive. Slovakia’s proposal, 
whereby the broadest possible context is taken into 
consideration when determining the growth rate of 
expenditure, was formed in response to this issue. This is 
the aforementioned concept of net worth, which resolves 
the inconsistency between the long-term benefits, which 
are often impossible to demonstrate, and short-term costs, 
which may restrict fiscal policy.
In summary, the expenditure rule can better help determine 
the extent of the responsibility of fiscal policy. This, on the 
one hand, assumes that every expenditure-like item 
determined by government decisions (quasi-fiscal spending, 
tax rebates, guaranties) is included within the rule’s scope. 
On the other hand, the inspection of revenues remains 
necessary, although in this case, the effect of the fiscal 
policy and the cycle are difficult to distinguish. Finally, the 
adequate distribution of central and local government tasks 
and resources is also required, without which the local 
government sector can be disproportionately burdened 
within the general government’s adjustment requirement. 
Compliance with the expenditure rule does not mean that 
it is underpinned by structural measures, but if such 
measures are in fact taken, the long-term benefits and 
short-term costs can be recognised when setting the growth 
rate of spending.
tHe FiSCAl COuNCil AS A 
SuPPORtiNG eNtitY
The fiscal framework represents the self-restraint of fiscal 
policy. This can only be achieved in a credible way if there 
is sufficient transparency. The required level of transparency 
fundamentally depends on the nature of the framework, in 
particular from the perspective of simplicity and 
enforceability. Greater transparency is required for those 
fiscal frameworks which are more complex and have severe 
sanctions. The institution of a fiscal council can be a key 
tool for ensuring transparency.
The role and tasks of fiscal councils can be very diverse, 
depending on the nature of the framework and the other 
players participating in its operation. Accordingly, fiscal 
councils may fulfil the following roles.
•   Supervision  of  the  fiscal  framework’s  operation.  this 
bears particular importance if rules are complex and 
cannot be directly evaluated by public opinion. This also 
applies to the fulfilment of certain procedural rules, such 
as compulsory compensation (PAYGO). In some countries, 
this task may also be performed by another independent 
organisation, such as the State Audit Office.
•   Macroeconomic projection. Preparing reliable forecasts is 
fundamental to making targets achievable and to 
triggering the escape clause. Regarding their legal status, 
forecasts can be either recommendations or compulsory, 
to be taken into account in budgetary planning and in 
making the decision on the escape clause. Organisations 
other than the fiscal council may prepare the 
macroeconomic forecast; in Slovakia, the forecast is 
instituted by a committee, also comprising private 
analysts. Independent market forecasts cannot be made 
use of automatically, as the fiscal council prepares rule-
based projections, according to which − contrary to 
private forecasts − special assumptions are made regarding 
future fiscal policy.
•   Assessment  of  the  impact  of  budgetary  measures  on 
revenues or expenditures. In many cases, fiscal policy 
only defines one parameter (such as the tax rate), 
changes in which have uncertain effects on the budget. 
The effect depends on the reactions of certain 
macroeconomic indicators, for which estimates must be 
prepared. This task may also be performed by some other MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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body; Slovakia has a separate committee assigned to this 
role, comprising private analysts.
•   Activation of the escape clause. Breach of the rules may 
occasionally be attributed to exogenous factors, and thus 
the application of potential sanctions may be restricted 
by the escape clause. A complex, albeit important task is 
the distinction of exogenous effects from the effects 
stemming from fiscal policy, as any error could allow 
discretionary loosening authorised by the escape clause. 
This task could also be performed by an independent 
organisation, which has competence in the domain of 
macroeconomic forecasting and analysis.
•   input for determining the fiscal framework’s parameters. 
According to the Slovakian recommendation, the fiscal 
council may take the responsibility of reviewing the 
growth rate specified under the expenditure rule. The net 
worth concept would present a solution to the 
contradiction between the long-term and the short-term 
impacts of structural measures. Setting the growth rate 
of expenditures, however, is essentially the government’s 
role, as it represents a question of social preferences.
•   Forecasting local government revenues and expenditures. 
The local government rule (if effective) and the resources 
channelled from the central budget may fundamentally 
determine the room for manoeuvre for local governments. 
Nevertheless, local governments retain their 
independence, which is why their financial management 
should be scrutinised. In addition to the local election 
cycle, indebtedness may also divert the local government 
balance from the level assumed by the central government; 
accordingly, commitments made to the EU may also be 
jeopardised.
•   Right of veto. the weight of the fiscal council’s operation 
is fundamentally determined by its capability to block the 
adoption process of the budget act if it disagrees with any 
point thereof. This may mean that the government could 
be required to resubmit the draft legislation, but a second 
blocking of the process may not be allowed. It may also 
mean that the right of veto can be exercised any number 
of times. In the event that no budget act has been 
adopted, a country has several legal options to choose 
from. One of them is a provisory budget that is based on 
the previous year. The other could be the failure of the 
government or Parliament. The more severe the 
consequence of the veto, the more important it is for the 
fiscal council to operate in a transparent manner.
•   Fiscal  analyses.  the  fiscal  council  may  also  prepare 
analyses if the results thereof have no direct impact on 
the rule’s operation. It could be worthwhile to “hold a 
mirror” to fiscal policy and examine the medium and 
long-term implications of keeping the fiscal policy 
unchanged in its current form.24 One of the dimensions of 
the analysis is the estimation of the economic cycle, a 
cornerstone of medium-term forecasting. The other 
dimension is generational accounting, a cornerstone of 
long-term projections. The effect of structural measures 
may also be displayed, in which the distinction of long-
term benefits and temporary costs is essential (see 
expenditure rule). Analytical activity may be positive 
(determining the fiscal impact of specific measures) or 
normative, formulating an evaluation (also taking into 
account social and welfare impacts), and may provide a 
basis for future decisions (such as the desired level of 
government activity). Such analyses may obviously be 
carried out by other independent institutions.
As the above shows, the range of possible functions varies 
widely, from analyses bearing no legal consequence to the 
right of veto. These functions call for different modes of 
operation from the various fiscal councils. The requirement 
for transparency increases in line with the severity of the 
legal consequences. While activation of the escape clause 
calls for the publication of the details of the applied 
methodology (applying, for instance, to cyclical adjustment), 
the results obtained and the record of the decision made, 
the right of veto also requires the statutory definition of 
forecasting rules.25
In summary, it can therefore be stated that it is the task 
of the fiscal council to increase transparency. This is the 
cornerstone of any fiscal framework. In order to gain 
broad support for the rules, public opinion must be formed 
in a way so as to also consider the restriction of high 
deficit or expenditures a necessity in addition to the 
limitation of public debt. Generally speaking, there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution for an optimal fiscal council. Its 
operation may provide support for the smooth operation 
of the other elements of the framework. The right of veto 
may be a fundamental element, similarly to the right of 
activating the escape clause. In order to carry out its 
functions adequately, the higher the level of competency 
held by the fiscal council, the higher the level of 
transparency called for. Its operations may also complement 
the rules in areas where they can be seen as overly 
simplified. From this perspective, fiscal analyses play an 
all-important role.
24   According to the EU’s package of economic governance legislative proposals, each member state should define the term of unchanged fiscal policy 
and make the assumptions, methodology and specific parameters public.
25 Only sufficiently detailed measures that have been approved in legislation can be taken into account.MNB BulletiN • juNe 2011 37
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CONCluSiONS
The economies of Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) are characterised by several 
common features. Their differences mainly reside in the 
achievement of debt trajectories, if we compare debt-to-
GDP ratio adjusted by the relative development (Chart 1). 
This relative development is measured in comparison to the 
EU average expressed in GDP calculated at purchasing 
power parity. This measure also diverges substantially 
among the four countries (Chart 2). The “stop-go” cycles in 
fiscal policy are apparent in the trends of both indicators, 
but given the small open nature of the Visegrád country 
economies, the increasing effect on public debt is more 
dominant. The regulation of fiscal policy is necessary for 
economic convergence, to restrict both the level of deficit 
and its fluctuations. Some Visegrád countries already have 
such rules in place, while those that do not are planning 
their introduction. The EU’s recent package of economic 
governance legislative proposals lends relevance to the 
review of the various potential elements of the fiscal 
frameworks. The details of each national framework should 
be custom-tailored to the features of the country; 
nevertheless, all of the pillars analysed above may be 
necessary, although with varying importance.
The first pillar is the debt rule, which may serve as a long-
term constraint on fiscal policy. The inclusion of this rule in 
the constitution lends it particular importance. The rule 
can only be truly efficient if its definition is close to the 
debt category determined by fiscal policy, and thus includes 
public companies and public private partnership liabilities. 
Effective operation is also contingent upon the escape 
clause to suspend the rule, in the event of exogenous 
factors increasing the level of debt, under well-specified 
conditions. In practice, however, the impact of fiscal 
loosening and exogenous factors is difficult to distinguish, 
and thus either a fiscal council should be granted the right 
to decide on the escape clause or protective bands allowing 
sufficient leeway surrounding the debt limit should be 
defined.
The second pillar is the balance target, where the medium 
term also becomes important in addition to individual 
years. Similarly to the debt limit, the target can only be 
truly efficient if its definition covers all items determined 
by fiscal policy, and thus includes investments by public 
companies and public private partnerships. As the effect of 
exogenous factors is difficult to filter out, provisions should 
be allocated to unforeseeable surprises or an escape clause 
should be incorporated for extreme cases. The balance 
target focused on the current year should also be assessed 
over a medium and long-term time horizon. The fiscal 
council’s analyses presenting the effect of the economic 
cycle on tax revenues or the sustainability of expenditures 
may be a useful analytical tool.
The third pillar is the expenditure rule, reflecting the 
responsibility of the fiscal policy, which may be an 
instrument of meeting the balance target consistent with 
medium-term frameworks. At the same time, revenue plans 
should remain reliable, in which an independent forecasting 
body could also play a role. The effectiveness of the 
expenditure rule assumes that, similarly to the previous 
pillars, every expenditure-like item stemming from a 
government decision, such as quasi-fiscal spending, tax 
expenditure, guaranties, is included within the rule’s scope. 
The adequate distribution of central and local government 
tasks and resources is also important for efficiency, as the 
absence of such distribution could lead to an excessive 
burden being put on the local government sector within an 
adjustment programme.
The fourth and final pillar is the fiscal council, which 
provides support for the entire fiscal framework. This may 
represent competences such as the right of veto or the 
activation of an escape clause. The higher the level of 
competency held by the fiscal council, the higher the level 
of transparency required. Supporting activity also means 
performing analyses. Compliance with the previous three 
pillars does not mean that their sustainability is supported 
by structural measures. The analysis of the fiscal council 
may highlight the absence of such measures. If, however, 
structural measures have been implemented, the analyses 
of the fiscal council may resolve the contradiction 
between long-term benefits and temporary costs, which it 
may take into account when defining the growth rate for 
expenditures.
There are two main conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the 
effectiveness of a rule increases in line with its coverage of 
the scope of fiscal policy. In this sense, the exception does 
not prove the rule. Secondly, filtering out the effect of 
exogenous factors is also important to ensure that rules 
only restrict fiscal policy. This is important to avoid the rule 
requiring the offsetting of revenues lost due to an economic 
slowdown with procyclical measures. In this sense, the 
exception proves the rule. The difficulty resides in the fact 
that the effects of exogenous factors and fiscal policy are 
difficult to distinguish. Resolving this methodologically 
difficult distinction may be one of the tasks of the fiscal 
council.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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